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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL RUBEY and 
CAROL RUBEY, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
vs. 
MORRIS T. WOOD and 
RUBY J. WOOD, his wife, 





Petition of Appellants for Rehearing 
TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
The above-named defendants and appellants re-
spectfully request a rehearing in the above-entitled case 
upon the following grounds: 
POINT 1 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CON-
SIDERING OR RULING UPON APPEL-
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LANTS' CONTENTION .. THAT THE AGREE-
MENTS HEREIN SHOULD BE CONSTRUED 
STRICTLY AGAINST RESPONDENTS WHO 
PREPARED THE CONTRACTS. 
POINT 2 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CON-
SIDERING OR CONSTRUING THE CON-
TRACTS HEREIN AS AMBIGUOUS, UN-
CERTAIN AND UNINTELLIGIBLE, AND 
IN REFUSING TO GRANT A TRIA~ TO 
DETERMINE THE TRUE INTENT OF 
THE PARTIES. 
POINT 3 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUS-
ING TO DIRECT LEGAL INTEREST TO 
ACCRUE ON THE CONTRACT BALANCE. 
POINT 4 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUS-
ING TO CONSIDER APPELLANTS' OBJEC-
TION TO THE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND 
COSTS ALLOWED HEREIN. 
Appellants respectfully submit that each of the 
above grounds are reflection of substantial error and 
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that the rulings thereon result in a judgment which is 
not equitable nor just. 
D. EUGENE LIVINGSTON 
and WILLIAM J. CAYIAS 
Attorneys for DefendaJ}ts 
and Appellants 
405 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CON-
SIDERING OR RULING UPON APPEL-
LANTS' CONTENTION THAT THE AGREE-
MENTS HEREIN SHOULD BE CONSTRUED 
STRICTLY AGAINST RESPONDENTS WHO 
PREPARED THE CONTRACTS. 
The court did not refer to nor comment on this 
point raised, in its opinion of May 25, 1964, and it is 
respectfully urged that it is a most serious and impor-
tant part of this proceeding and appeal. 
The well-recognized rule is set out in our brief on 
appeal and also in the recent Utah case of Vera M. Stout 
vs. Washington Fire and Marine Insurance Co.~ found 
in 14 Utah 2nd 214; 385 Pac. 2nd 608. See also Com-
mercial Credit Corp. vs. Pre1nier Insurance Co.~ 12 
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Utah 2nd 321, 366 Pac. 2nd 476; Huber and Rowland 
Construction Co. vs. City of South Salt Lake., 7 Utah 
2nd 273, 323 Pac. 2nd 259. 
The transcript in the original proceeding reflects 
Rubey as an experienced man in language and real 
estate dealings, and Wood as a farmer, unskilled in 
either, and further reflects Rubey as the one who typed 
up the contract in the one instance and wrote it in long-
hand in the other. 
As lawyers, we know the injustice and unfairness 
that can be accomplished by the choice of terms and 
words by a professional as against a lay man, and that 
is exactly what took place in this instance. Things were 
discussed and agreed upon but the language used did 
not state it as it was agreed. Certainly, this court rec-
ognizes the wide difference in experience and business 
acumen as to these people and that it is an important 
factor herein. See Lewis vs. White., 2 Utah 2nd 101, 
219 Pac. 2nd 865 and Elder vs. Clawson., 14 Utah 2nd 
384, 384 Pac. 2nd 802. 
Can a court of equity stand by and allow injustice 
to be accomplished by such sharp practice 1 'V e respect-
fully urge this court to reconsider this point, to give 
weight to it and to allow a determination of the true 
intent of these parties by taking testimony and evidence. 
Actually, these appellants still have not had their 
day in court. This court ruled originally that there was 
no fraud and the District Court limited its original deci-
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sion to that point. Since that time, defendants have not 
been allowed nor permitted to place testimony or evi-
dence before the court on the interpretation of the 
contracts. Shouldn't appellants be allowed to explore 
and take testimony on the contract itself especially 
where it is drawn so much for one side and interpretation 
of the contract? Shouldn't appellants be allowed to 
explore and take testimony on the contract its~lf espe-
cially where it is drawn so much for one side and inter-
preted for one side-the respondents? 
We urge the court to re-examine· the record in· this 
matter. Counsel for respondents prepared the inter:-
pretation on phases of the agreements and despite 1nany 
protests and objections of appellants, the interpretation 
of respondents was adopted. The lower court gave little, 
if any, consideration to contentions of appellants and 
ruled against them in almost every instance. 
POINT 2 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT, CON-
SIDERING OR CONSTRUING THE CON-
TRACTS HEREIN AS AMBIGUOUS, UN-
CERTAIN AND UNINTELLIGIBLE, AND 
IN REFUSING TO GRANT A TRIAL TO 
DETERMINE THE TRUE INTENT OF 
THE PARTIES. 
Attention is respectfully called to the first para-
graph of the agreement, dated April 18, 1959, where 
it states that the sellers are given the unconditional right 
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to keep all crops of every kind whatsoever .until the 
property is completely paid for, unless otherwise mutu-
ally agreed. The decree of the lower Court does not now 
so provide. This provision also could lead to the con-
clusion sellers retain full possession until the entire 
purchase price is paid. Certainly this needs clarification. 
The contract then goes on to provide, "That the 
sellers hereby grant the buyers a release clause, provided 
the buyers give 18 months _qr until the land is cropped, 
whichever time is sooner ... " We respectfully submit 
that there is no determination or definition of what con-
stitutes a release clause, and that this can only be de-
termined by having testimony taken concerning what 
the parties meant that to be. The contract also provides 
for release of the land at ejther the east or west end, but 
does not state who has the choice and the mechanics 
of effecting any partition release or other disposition. 
It is also respectfully submitted that the release 
clause does not release the buyers in any way. We urge 
that this provision as to a release cannot be subject to a 
legal interpretation without having background and 
evidence concerning what the parties meant by a release 
clause. 
Attention is respectfully called to the indefinite-
ness of the contract as to dates for payment. There is 
no exact date set out as to payments and the only way 
that a determination could be had as to time for pay-
ments would be by evidence and testimony. Attention 
is also called to the fact that there is no possession date 
given in the contracts, and that this is not known and is 
not clear from either one of the agreements. 
The other side of the coin, with respect to the 
agreements, is to determine what enforcement remedies 
the Wood people would have should Rubey not pay on 
the contract. Could 'Vood make Rubey buy and on 
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what terms, what lands could he force him to take and 
when could he force him to take it and at what point, 
and how much? All of these questions remain un-
answered as far as the agreements are concerned. 
It is clear from the original transcript that it was 
agreed Rubey was to pay $69,000.00 on or before April 
18th of the next year. (See Pages 89-90 and 95 of the 
transcript.) If this is to be construed as part of the con-
tract, then it should be paid and Wood could meet the 
commitment that he had made to acquire property in 
Idaho, and based upon the promise and agreement of 
Rubey to make the payment of $69,000.00. The question 
of "or more," is most important with respect to the 
$69,000.00, as this was placed in the contracts as an 
inducement for Wood to execute the agreement and 
Wood properly anticipated that he would receive this 
substantial payment within the year. 
Attention is respectfully called to the fact that the 
agreements make no referral to interest or the forebear-
ance of interest, and while our position on the appeal 
is that interest accrued as a matter of law, this is a matter 
that should be reviewed by evidence and testimony to 
determine what the intentions of the parties were with 
respect to interest. 
Another important point of interpretation with re-
spect to the agreement is to determine why Wood sold 
his farm and what representations were made by Rubey 
to obtain the Woods' signatures to the contract. 
If one examines both of the contracts at the same 
time, there is ambiguity, indefiniteness and uncertainty 
with respect to the following matters: 
(A) Are the contracts annual renewable options or are 
they preliminary real estate sale contracts. 
(B) What amounts are to be paid and what are the 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dates that such payments are to be made, and 
when is the $69,000.00 to be paid that was pro-
mised in order to induce Wood to sign the agree-
ment. 
(C) There is no time element specified in the contract 
as to how long it is to run. 
(D) All through both agreements appear the term, 
"unless otherwise agreed to." This reflects that 
other arrangements and other discussions were had 
with respect to the agreement itself. 
An overall review of the contract would indicate 
that the agreements are not an out-and-out purchase 
agreement but merely an option arrangement as there 
are no equitable remedies as far as breach is concerned 
should Rubey breach or violate the agreements. 
'Vhile the contract makes some reference to other 
pieces of ground, no determination has yet been made 
as to those parcels, and part of this lawsuit should be a 
determination whether those parcels are part of this 
arrangement or agreement. 
We respectfully submit that a careful review of 
both contracts will reflect that there is serious ambiguity 
and uncertainty about the agreements with respect to 
identifying them as to the types of agreements, whether 
they are options or sales agreements. There is serious 
question about property descriptions, the terms of the 
payments, the amount that should be paid initially and 
what amount should be paid within one year, what length 
of time is involved with respect to the payments, what 
interest rate is to be charged on any deferred payments, 
and what time is to be allowed as to deferred payments. 
There is also a serious question about possession dates 
and there is a tremendous lack of 1nutuality as far as the 
contract is concerned. Evidence should be taken with 
respect to determining the purpose ''roods sold their 
10 
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property and the anticipation that they had with respect 
to monies coming from the sale of this ground to help 
them buy the property in the State of Idaho. 
We urge this Court to decree and order a further 
hearing so that the words of the agreement can be con-
strued the way the parties talked about them and in-
tended them to be construed. We submit that Appellant 
\Vood has never had the opportunity to have his day in 
Court as to a determination of the parties contracts and 
what was intended. 
POINT 3 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUS-
ING TO DIRECT LEGAL INTEREST TO 
ACCRUE ON THE CONTRACT BALANCE. 
Certainly as a matter of knowledge and information 
for counsel, future litigants and for efforts of appellants 
herein, a definite ruling should be made as to the con-
tracts and whether interest accrues if no mention is m-ade 
of it in the contracts. 
It has long been the law in Utah that interest is 
allowed on debts overdue, even in absence of statute a 
contract provides therefor. (See W a8atch Mining Co. 
vs. Cresent Mining Co.~ 7. Utah 8, 24 Pac. 58~, affirmed 
151 U.S. 317, 14 S.Ct. 348.) 
We respectfully argue that the court should rule 
as a matter of law that interest is due on the balance 
of the contract unpaid. We reiterate, however, that in 
view of the lack of an expression in the contracts as to 
11 
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interest, evidence should be taken to determine what the 
parties intended. 
POINT 4 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUS-
ING TO CONSIDER APPELLANTS' OBJEC-
TION TO THE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND 
COSTS ALLOWED HEREIN. 
A review of the record in this matter will reflect 
no testimony or evidence as to the attorneys' fees allowed 
by court to respondents. The Bar Schedule of fees was 
not introduced, no testimony was given as to time put in 
by counsel for respondents and no cross-examination or 
connter evidence was allowed to appellants. Respond-
ents' attorney told the District Court in conference that 
so much time and charges had been put in on case and 
court granted the figure requested. 'V e submit that 
appellants as a matter of equity and of law are entitled 
to at least cross-examine and to put in testimony if need 
be, about the reasonableness of attorneys' fees. Cer-
tainly, appellants should not be penalized for unneces-
sary conferences or time taken up by respondents with-
out need therefor, and no testimony or evidence was 
taken to show all time charged was actually spent on 
this case, or that it covered matters involved in the 
appeals or hearings after one attorney's fee had been 
allowed. Not one scintilla of foundation was made or 
offered in support of fees allowed. 
12 
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In the matter of Jensen vs. Lichtewtein et al~ 45 
Utah 320, 145 Pacific 1036, the Utah Supreme Court 
commented at length on attorney fees and said: 
"By a reasonable fee no doubt, is meant one 
which is reasonable under all the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case. What is reasonable, 
therefore, in a large measure at least, must de-
pend upon the amount in controversy, the labor, 
the responsibility imposed upon the attorney in 
obtaining judgment, as these things may have 
arisen from the issues presented and tried." 
In the present case, there was no evidence of what 
hourly rate was charged, what time was put in the case, 
or who controlled the time required for the case. In 
other words no evidence at all was presented with re-
spect to justifying or proving the reasonableness of any 
attorney fees. 
We submit that in the interest of justice and fair-
ness that this matter be referred for further hearing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. EUGENE LIVINGSTON and 
WILLIAM .J. CAYIAS 
Attorneys for Appellants 
405 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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